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Review: Ralph Wedgwood, The Value of Rationality, OUP 2017, 267pp.
By Joseph Raz, Columbia University and KCL
The book is the first of a planned trilogy, with Rationality and Belief and Rationality and
Choice to follow, titles which signal Wedgwood’s view that one concept of rationality applies
across the practical and epistemic domains. The book’s chapters deal with a variety of
disparate issues (e.g., ‘ought implies can’, the nature of reasons, the meaning of ‘ought’, the
structure of virtue, the virtue of rationality, comparative values), each well worth studying
for its own sake, and each explored with reference to the history of the subject, and to
some of the relevant discussions. Yet, together they combine into a theory of rationality and
its value. Wedgwood is developing a theory of the concept in order to understand the
property it expresses. The concept is used primarily to evaluate mental states (belief,
intention) and events (decision, judgement), an evaluation that is based purely on the
degree to which the mental states and events present in the thinker’s mind at or shortly
before the relevant time (internalism), constitute a coherent pattern. Norms of rationality,
i.e. principles specifying what rationality requires, are constitutive of the mental state to
which they apply. I assume that that means that what makes the mental state one of that
kind is that certain requirements of rationality apply to it, those that apply to the kind.
Wedgwood underlines another aspect: each type of mental state and event that can be
rational has an aim, and thinking rationally is a means to satisfying the end. Beliefs aim at
truth and choice aims at the practicable good. The means to the ends are mental states that
are correct, that is, ones that conform to norms of correctness that are themselves
constitutive of the types of mental state, though they evaluate mental states by their
relations to the external world. Both rationality and correctness come in degrees. The more
irrational a person’s ways of thinking are the more incorrect his thinking is likely to be.
In my view Wedgwood limits his achievement by misidentifying his topic. “To think
rationally is to think as one should” (1), he writes, encouraging the hope that he will
conceive of rationality as the virtue of reason, a virtue manifested in the proper exercise of
rational powers. However, ‘rationality’, as Wedgwood understands it, is confined to “the
proper use of our reasoning faculties” (32), and important as the reasoning faculties are,
they are only part of our rational faculties, which include powers of concentration,
attention, decisiveness, discrimination, sensitivity and more.
Equally, if not more damaging to his ambition is his claim that the proper use of our
reasoning faculties is judged by the outcome of their use, which leads him to identify
rationality with a pattern of mental states and events. In fact, failure to reason properly is
manifested in the manner of reasoning and not in its results. One’s reasoning may be faulty,
even irrational, when the result is fortunate (and, say, displays the right pattern). Reasoning
in a reckless, inattentive, negligent etc. manner is irrational whatever the result. However,
Wedgwood is right to point out that for the most part studies of rationality in decision
theory and formal epistemology are taken to be a study of the coherence of (some) mental
states, and one of his aims is to provide an account that applies to those disciplines.
Wedgwood regards as his main challenge to explain the relevance of coherence to
rationality. “The norms of rationality are both pervasive … and have an inescapable grip on
us - we necessarily already have a disposition to conform to them. However, it is puzzling
how there can be any norms of this sort that evaluate mental events purely on the basis of
coherence. Why does coherence matter? Surely it is nothing more than just a pretty pattern
of mental states. Why is it a matter of any importance whatsoever whether one’s mental
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states form this pretty pattern or not?” (4) The reader has to wait to the last couple of
chapters for Wedgwood’s answer. First, he turns to his thesis that there is only one concept
of rationality – a view that can be properly debated only when we confront at least two
conflicting accounts of rationality and the question arises whether at least one of them is
mistaken or whether perhaps both are correct accounts of different concepts of rationality,
both of which have their legitimate uses. Then he turns to the first of several arguments
that the concept of rationality is a normative concept: “There is a way of using the terms
‘rational’ and ‘justified’ so that phrases like ‘rational belief’ mean exactly the same thing as
‘justified belief’ … in this book, I shall be using the terms ‘rational’ and ‘justified’ in this way.
But the term ‘justified’ surely expresses a normative concept.” (26-7) More significant is the
observation: “To use our faculty of reason ‘properly’ is to use it as it should be used. When a
belief or a choice derives from the proper use of this faculty it thereby has what in the
broadest sense could be called a kind of virtue or excellence - a feature in virtue of which
beliefs (and the like) can count as good, or worthy of a certain kind of commendation”. (256) Moreover, “it seems plausible that irrationality is always and necessarily some kind of
defect or flaw or blemish … This makes it plausible that it is a conceptual truth that
irrationality is some kind of defect or flaw.” (26) So, the concept of rationality is itself a
normative concept.
At a minimum these points show that ‘x is rational’ is commonly used to indicate that a
certain standard has been met, and ‘x is irrational’ to indicate that a certain standard was
not met. Furthermore, the standards are embedded in familiar contexts that are part and
parcel of ordinary life (unlike, e.g., an invented game with its own standards), and rationality
has to do with success in the use of some skill or ability. Correct spelling or pronunciation
are similar examples. And there is no objection to claiming that they are normative
concepts, if that is what the term is used to convey. But Wedgwood takes rationality to
convey something more than that: That rationality is a normative concept implies “(a)
rational mental states … [and] events are in a way good, or worthy of commendation; (b) if a
thinker is rationally required to ø then there is a sense in which the thinker rationally ought
to ø.” (40) Now, while it follows that if one is to spell correctly one ought to conform to the
standards of spelling, it is doubtful that there is a non-trivial sense of ‘ought’ in which it is
true that one ought to follow the standards of spelling.
Does Wedgwood succeed in establishing that if one is rationally required to ø or to believe
that p then one ought to ø or to believe that p? He discusses several objections, (the most
important of which, the doubt about the normative implications of coherence, is addressed
only in Chapter 9). According to the first objection normativity depends on how things are in
the world whereas rationality is entirely mind dependent, hence they can come apart. Given
that it can be bad to be rational, rational requirements are not normative. (34-5) Influenced
by ‘the wrong kind of reasons’ writings Wedgwood suggests that the problem arises when
“unusual costs and benefits, such as could be created by manipulative demons or eccentric
billionaires” apply (41). In fact, such cost and benefits often arise in ordinary circumstances.
For example, quite a few people may be able to obtain a job in the American Administration
if they hold false views about its character. They may also do much good in the world in that
case. Moreover, given what they know or are in position to know, it may be irrational of
them to have those views, yet normatively speaking they should hold them, because having
them is beneficial for them or for others.
Wedgwood’s solution is to distinguish between two concepts of ought. He rejects the view
that the distinction between right and wrong reasons is or tracks the distinction between
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object and state reasons, because the latter cannot explain why whatever makes it irrational
to believe a Moore-paradoxical proposition is a right reason for not believing it (45); nor can
they explain why the reason not to intend to ø when you have reason to ø, and can ø
(provided that you do not intend to ø), is the right reason (46). Instead he maintains that in
the cases under consideration you ought to have a positive attitude toward a proposition
that you ought not to have. In other words, you have a conflict precisely because you are
subject to two conflicting ought propositions, though they express two different ought
concepts (50). Wedgwood adds that ‘the right kind of reasons’ are constitutive of a kind of
reasoning guiding us to an attitude or event. The wrong kind of reasons can be told apart by
not being constitutive of such reasoning.
The second objection is due to the fact that it is possible rationally to believe false
propositions. In such cases it is irrational to give up one’s rational false beliefs, so that one is
rationally required to believe a proposition that is false. If the belief is that you ought to ø,
you are normatively required to have it even though it is not the case that you ought to ø.
Hence rationality is not normative. Wedgwood rightly denies that the wide scope/narrow
scope distinction refutes the objection. Instead he points out that as the rational is internal,
supervening on the agent’s mental states and events, the oughts that rational requirements
yield are ‘subjective’ or information-relative oughts, relativized to the epistemic perspective
of the agent who is under discussion. The subjective ought is, according to Wedgwood,
relative not to all the agent’s beliefs, but to a coherent epistemic perspective that he
inhabits, which comprises experiences etc. besides beliefs, but is free of crazy or insane
beliefs. In this he differs both from Parfit and Schroeder, who relativize to all and only
beliefs, and from Kiesewetter and Lord, who relativize to available evidence only (Parfit 2011,
pp. 111-113; Schroeder 2009, p. 223; Kiesewetter 2018; and Lord 2017, p. 504) . While maintaining
that what rationality requires is that one have beliefs required by one’s relatively coherent
mental states, Wedgwood allows that there may be beliefs about what would be required
from another epistemic perspective; thus, he maintains, the second objection is avoided
(59-60). Wedgwood allows that: It ought1 to be that: if you believe that it ought2 to be that
you now ø then you now ø. If the two oughts relate to different epistemic perspectives then
no contradiction need follow. Assume two propositions belonging to two perspectives: (A)
you ought to believe that B; (B) you ought now to . (The subscripts indicate that that
‘ought’ is perspectival.) Even if B is false, it is possible that A is true, that is, that you ought1
to believe that you ought2 to  now. If A and B relate to the same epistemic perspective,
then Wedgwood requires that one cannot be rationally required to believe that A.
The third objection, that rationality cannot be normative because ought implies can while
what we rationally ought to believe or do need not be something we can believe or do, is
treated to an extended discussion (chapter 3) of the semantics of ‘can’ in terms of
dispositions and opportunities, explained within the framework of possible world semantics.
Some readers will be disappointed that Wedgwood avoided a thorough discussion of the
rationale of the ought implies can slogan, and its limits, as well as the entangled questions
of the dependence, if any, of cognitive states on the will.
Chapter 4 is dedicated to a criticism of a vague view called ‘Reasons First’, defined as
holding that there is one central concept of normative reasons that is more basic and
central than all other normative concepts (who belongs with this company is far from clear –
I am given that honour but I deny that the concept of normative reasons is more basic than
that of value). Wedgwood is familiar with a wide range of writings that he associates with
this view, and he raises a number of issues they should and do contend with. Central to
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those is the connection that all those writers point to (in their various ways) between the
way normative reasons can guide people’s reactions to the way things are, and the way they
could contribute to explanations of people’s reactions to the way things are. He points to a
number of problems whose solution is required for ‘a normative reason’ to be this dual
aspect concept. I found most instructive the suggestion that explanations of people’s
responses to reasons (as I would prefer to put the point) include factors other than beliefs,
or the facts they represent. Oddly, he refrains from discussing in detail any of the solutions
offered to the questions he raised, presumably thinking that as there is no common Reasons
First reply none can be given – true only in that as Reasons First writers disagree, no single
set of solutions would satisfy all of them.
Chapter 5 stands out in being the only one in the book offering a partial account of the
meaning of an English word, ‘ought’. Borrowing from possible world semantic accounts of
modal concepts Wedgwood’s account introduces probabilistic distributions to represent
epistemic perspectives and a value function which evaluates alternatives relative to certain
values. Wedgwood mentions that his preferred understanding of linguistic competence is
through ability to use a word to express concepts within the range of concepts it can be
used to express – a plausible suggestion which would have led him in different directions,
even when dealing with the range of semantic values of ‘ought’.
Chapter 6 begins with what is perhaps an over-inclusive account of virtue. Basically, if a
disposition is good its goodness is a virtue, and whenever the disposition is non-accidentally
manifested the manifestation has that virtue (141). So, a disposition to sneeze which is good
in relieving an itch has the virtue of relieving itches, and a particular sneeze is virtuous if it
non-accidentally relieves that kind of itch. “It is abstractly rational for an agent to ø iff there
is an available way for an agent to respond to her situation that would consist of the
manifestation of rational dispositions, and would result in the agent ø-ing. Rational
dispositions are all and only those dispositions that reliably lead the agent to respond to her
situation in ways in which it is abstractly rational for her to respond”. (142) Disposition is a
notoriously tricky concept. I suspect that Wedgwood’s discussion is not helpful. Consider
the following examples: I am (1) disposed to stroke my hair in a certain way, roughly
meaning that when I stroke my hair, intentionally or otherwise, then other things being
equal I stroke it in that way, which involves a skill to stroke it pleasantly, without scratching
my skull, and without drawing attention to the activity. I am also (2) disposed to stroke it
when bored. Knowing that my friends are aware of this, I am (3) disposed to intentionally
stroke it when I have reason to indicate that I am bored without saying so. I am stroking my
hair right now. Which, if any, of my dispositions led me to do so? Not (1): it is usually
manifested when I stroke my hair but never leads to my doing so. While manifested in my
stroking my hair, (3), like (1) never leads to it. (2) may lead to it, but clearly not now, as I am
stroking my hair to make a point, i.e. for a reason, and none of my hair stroking dispositions
led to it. Did my disposition to be rational lead to it? Assuming that I have it, it is analogous
to (3) above. It is a capacity to act for a reason, which I use when I act for a reason, but it
does not lead me to act for a reason. So, dispositions are involved in rational responses, in
various ways, and some may lead to a rational response. But we need a finer grained
analysis than is to be found here to identify them and how they do so.
As the chapter proceeds Wedgwood introduces subdivisions, which help in leading us closer
to, say dispositions to behave in a virtuous way. But they do not explain the differences
among dispositions, nor account for the type of dispositions that are involved in being
rational. To do so we need an account of the difference between being led passively by
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one’s dispositions (which is all that some virtues require) and being active, as one is when
acting rationally in response to reasons – these matters remain unexplored.
Chapter 7 provides an extensive defence of the internalism of rationality, as well as the
claim that if it is rational for me to believe, intend etc. something then I ought (in some
sense) to believe, intend, etc. it. The defence is an elaborate and careful statement of the
argument from common content: “Consider two possible worlds, w1 and w2. In both worlds,
you have exactly the same experiences, apparent memories, and intuitions and in both
worlds you go through exactly the same processes of reasoning, forming, maintaining and
revising exactly the same beliefs in exactly the same ways. It seems clear that these two
worlds are also exactly alike with respect to which of your beliefs are rational and which are
irrational. Now suppose that in w1 you are bedevilled by an evil demon who ensures that
many of your experiences are misleading, with the result that many of the beliefs that you
hold in w1 are false. In w2, on the other hand, almost all your experiences are veridical, with
the result that almost all the beliefs that you hold in w2 are true. Intuitively, this makes no
difference. Exactly the same beliefs are rational in both worlds.” (162). Wedgwood proceeds
to defend and refine this kind of argument, considering its application to narrow content in
twin earth arguments and to hallucination in the case of perception. It is one of the richest
and best chapters in the book, but it does leave some questions. We judge the rationality of
reasoning, and other activities involving our rational powers. But we also judge the
rationality of the outcomes of such activities: have we acquired irrational beliefs as a result
of irrational reasoning? Etc. Wedgwood’s arguments seem addressed at the activities, and
leave one wondering about their results. An example: I may do something whose outcome
depends on whether or not there is anything in my front garden. I believe that there is
nothing, but decide, as I should, to re-examine the question. I do so, confirming my earlier
belief. But my re-examination was sloppy and did not meet the standards of rationality that
applied in the circumstances. My re-examination was, let us conclude, irrational. However,
in the circumstances I acquired no false beliefs as a result. I believe, as I did before, that the
front yard is empty. Is this belief irrational? It seems that it would be false to claim both that
it is and that it is not. It is the outcome of my re-examination taken when I already believed
that the yard is empty, and there is no truth of the matter whether I would have reached
the same conclusion had I not that belief already (and remember that rationality is tested by
recent mental events, so my belief cannot be irrational because of some event far in the
past). Now change the example: during the processes of re-examination a new object was in
fact placed in the yard. I would have become aware of it had the re-examination been
rational. Now, it appears that my re-confirmed (and now false) belief that the yard is empty
is irrational, because it is due to an irrational examination that led to a false conclusion.
Wedgwood’s argument refines the kind of internalism he assumes (it is required for rational
requirements to be capable of guiding reasoning, i.e. transition from some mental states to
others), but I think that it is at odds with, or at least undecided in, cases in which that the
conclusion is false is part of what makes it irrational.
Here again Wedgwood’s argument turns on the existence of dispositions to react to some
mental states or events by adopting or dropping others. The dispositions are constitutive of
the type of mental states involved, and the requirements of rationality express their
content. As before the account strikes me as incomplete, in failing to distinguish between
passive conditional reflex type dispositions and those in which the agent is active in light of
his or her understanding of the reasons he or she confronts.
In suggesting that the account is incomplete I have not challenged Wedgwood’s assumption
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that if rational requirements are constitutive we have a disposition to comply with them.
But is this a non-sequitur? An alternative would go: when thinking about how things are, for
any of the many reasons that may lead one to do so or for no reason at all, one thinks in
ways which subject one’s thinking to the norms of that type of thought, meaning one
accepts that violations of those norms would be a mistake. How does one know how to
submit to norms of rationality? One learns gradually, from early childhood, as part of
learning a language. Does one need to decide to use the capacity to subject one’s thinking
to these norms? No, their use is a skill which is automatically engaged (not always
successfully) whenever one thinks about how things are. Sometimes one does not subject
oneself to these norms. These are not cases in which dispositions fail. They are cases of day
dreaming, fantasising, etc., rather than thinking about how things are. So understood the
norms of rationality are constitutive, but do not depend on any dispositions, at least not in
the way imagined by Wedgwood. But if that is the constitutive nature of norms of
rationality, their normativity has to be re-examined.
For Wedgwood the route to normativity goes through the virtue of rationality, which is a
special virtue, one of a “plethora of different values that are all non-relative” (i.e. do not
depend on standards whose value is relative to some contingent aim) and yet the rational
requirements it imposes (the ought propositions it makes true) do not conflict (as do other
virtues and their requirements). Wedgwood thinks that it is in the nature of rationality that
it has that character. There is no explanation of that. But there is a need to explain how such
a virtue can exist. He briefly considers and rejects as inadequate to the task explanations
based on Dutch book arguments and on the constitutive character of rational requirements.
Rather, Wedgwood maps mental states and events present in the thinker’s mind at a given
time onto a rational estimate of degree of incorrectness of every way of thinking, based on
the assumption that the less irrational a way of thinking is the less it is likely to be incorrect.
The bulk of chapter 9 explains this system of rational estimates of the probability of
incorrectness. In other words, if we can attribute a rational probabilistic assessment of the
degree of incorrectness of different ways of thinking we would be able to determine the
degree of rationality of different ways of thinking: the smaller the probability that they are
incorrect the less irrational they are. The aim of thinking is correctness and rationality is a
means to correctness, a probability-based guide to what is less likely to be incorrect.
There is much to discuss regarding the presuppositions of Wedgwood’s probabilistic
assessment of degrees of incorrectness. But the suggestion is based on a few simpler
assumptions that attract little attention in the book. In what way is rationality relevant to
correctness? Some may think that it depends on the different categories of requirements of
correctness. E.g. it may be a rational requirement not to believe a conjunction and the
falsity of one of its conjuncts. And there may be an argument to take the correctness of a
conjunction to be a reason for the correctness of each conjunct. Here a connection between
rationality and correctness, though its precise form is not easy to state, seems plausible. But
if my auditory experience can be a reason to believe that there is a cat around – is it a
rational requirement for that belief? This is less clear in principle, and it is much more
difficult to state the connection in detail. How about, my experience being a reason to
believe that the person in front of me is getting irritated by my presence? It definitely may
be good evidence for that belief, but what exactly is it that makes me irrational or less
rational if I fail to perceive his irritation? Wedgwood’s identification of rational belief with
justified belief requires that not only correctness but rationality is involved in all such cases.
He may be right, but the case for that view is not made in the book.
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It is a virtue of the book, which is sophisticated and dense with argument about all the
matters it discusses, that it ends with a list of some of the questions that remain to be
explored for its account of rationality to be acceptable.
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